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11. Book Notes: 
Theory’s Empire  1
Tim Burke
So, over at The Valve, they’re talking about the new anthology 
Theory’s Empire, and I was asked to join in the fun. Beware of what 
you ask for: I may have achieved true Holbonian length here, at 3,000 
words or so.
I’ll start, like the book itself, with Jeff Reid’s cartoon “Breakfast 
Theory: a Morning Methodology”. (“Pretty dry and flavorless, isn’t 
it?” “Your question is informed, or should I say misinformed, by the 
conventionalized bourgeois cereal paradigm ...”) I was one of the thou-
sands of academics in graduate school or newly hired in 1989 who 
cut that cartoon out and put it up on a bulletin board. I remember 
showing it to my wife, saying it was the funniest thing I’d seen. She 
read it attentively and smiled politely.
The cartoon stayed funny but it also started to become an emblem 
of something else for me, a growing awareness of distress. In 1989, I 
was well into graduate school. I’d actually had a lot of exposure to 
“critical theory” as an undergraduate major in history and English in 
the mid-1980s. I’d even had a class with Judith Butler on Foucault 
while she was at Wesleyan. I liked theory, even when I felt I didn’t have 
the faintest idea what was going on, because if nothing else you could 
sense the energy behind it, that the theorists we read were urgently 
engaged by their work, the professors who taught the theorists were 
among the most exciting and skilled teachers at the college, because in 
the backwash of the 1960s and 1970s, many of us had a restless sense 
that the next intellectual and political step was waiting to be taken, but 
none of us knew what that might be. Theory made you feel almost like 
you were in the dream of the Enlightenment again, everyone speaking 
the same language with disciplines and specializations set aside.
The cartoon was funny for those of who spent time reading, think-
ing, speaking theory at a very particular moment in the institutional 
and intellectual history of American academia. For anyone who didn’t, 
the cartoon is mildly amusing in another way: as a kind of pre-Sokal 
confirmation that the eggheads in the humanities had gone deep into 
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the swamps of nonsense and pomposity. And this is how the cartoon 
wormed its way into my head: both as a funny satire of things I did and 
said and as a salvage operation dredging up an intellectual self already 
alienated by the distance between what I found myself doing as an 
academic-in-training and the underlying desires I’d brought with me 
when I signed up to get a Ph.D.
Which is still how I feel now about “theory” and its alleged over-
throw. I warm to the talk that it was an empire, but I’m equally aware 
that my sense of it as such is a direct personal consequence of my 
individual experience of academic careerism. I warm to the various 
critiques and denunciations of theory in the volume but to some extent 
because I get both the insider and outsider version of them, the same 
way I could read the cartoon in two idioms—and for the same reason, 
the glee of some contributors can be a bit off-putting. This is why I 
tend to bristle on one hand at know-nothing denunciations of theory, 
like E.O. Wilson’s in Consilience, but also at circle-the-wagons defenses 
of it, or even those defenses which argue that the problem with theory 
was only its occasional excesses and over-zealous acolytes.
The main point, and it is one made again and again throughout the 
anthology, is that theory was above all a professional consciousness, a 
way of feeling and being academic that was native to a past time and 
place (the 1980s and early 1990s). You can’t just separate out some of 
the chief manifestations of the era of theory, like the star system, as un-
related epiphenomena, or insist that we just talk about the actual texts. 
(Though at the same time, the volume could really use an ethnographic 
retelling of a conference or conversation from the late 1980s or early 
1990s. Anthony Appiah comes closest in his short essay, and maybe 
there’s nothing that really fits the bill besides a David Lodge novel.)
This is not to say that theory’s moment is done and gone, with no 
harm to anyone. There was lasting damage done in a variety of ways.
A number of contributors observe that one thing that the theoreti-
cal moment did which has had lasting effects on academic writing in 
general is not so much the feared disfigurations of jargon but the es-
calating grandiosity of scholarly claims, the overinflation of argument, 
the Kissinger-joke ramping up of the presumed stakes in scholarly 
writing and speaking. Theory, particularly but not solely in literary 
studies, withdrew from an imagined relation to public discourse which 
apportioned it a mostly modest role but in exact inverse proportion 
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to that retreat developed a more and more exaggerated sense of the 
importance of its own discourse.
You cannot just make this a folly of the theorists, or talk about it in 
isolation from the economic and institutional changes in the academy 
itself. Academic literary critics in 1950, like most professors, made 
poor salaries while working for institutions which were still relatively 
distant from American mass society. Professors in 1989, particularly 
those employed by selective colleges and universities, were working for 
institutions which were relatively wealthy, paid good salaries and of-
fered good benefits, and which were now a familiar component of the 
American dream. Most research university departments in the humani-
ties and the social sciences at that time also had to confront the seismic 
shift in the internal budgeting of their institutions, that external grants 
not only kept the sciences going but also funded the whole institution 
in major ways. The scientists weren’t usually being modest about the 
usefulness of their research in their grant applications, and a good deal 
of that spilled over as a pressure on the rest of the academy.
This inflation has a lot to do with explaining the relation between 
the first wave of high theory and its evolution into historicism and 
identity politics of the race/class/gender variety, much discussed in 
the anthology. (In many ways, this mutation is the central issue under 
discussion.) On paper, this relation is hard to explain: it is not an easy 
or natural evolution of argument from the initial round of continental 
postmodern or poststructuralist philosophy, much less so from the first 
wave of the high priests of deconstruction in the United States like 
Paul de Man. The contributors to the anthology hammer on this point 
again and again, but it’s worth emphasizing: whatever “theory” began 
as, it quickly metastasized into a much vaguer way of being and act-
ing that could be found in most corners and byways of the academic 
humanities, and a way of being and acting that was often a new and 
virulent practice of academic warfare which left a lot of casualties and 
fortifications in its wake.
It’s true that a response to the volume that insists on reconfining 
theory to a properly constrained set of texts and authors has a valid 
point. If nothing else, it leads to taking the actual content of actual writ-
ing seriously, rather than just a marker of academic sociology. Saussure, 
Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, and even many of the various American aca-
demic superstars who dominated the era of theory like Fish, Jameson, 
or Spivak had important, substantive arguments to make that can’t 
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just be waved away or ignored. (Nor does this anthology: it collects 
some smart detailed ripostes to the substantive arguments of Derrida 
and many other theorists.) Still, I agree with many of Theory’s Empire’s 
authors: the Geist and historical moment of theory is an equally impor-
tant part of the subject.
Which may be best known experientially, by those of us who lived 
through the sometimes-subtle, sometimes-blatant transformations 
high theory brought to academic practice and consciousness. Many 
are right to say that is a perilous claim, not to mention a potentially 
narcissistic one: it’s a short step from that insistence that “I lived it, so I 
know it”, to blasting everything you don’t like as “postmodernism”, to 
ignoring the things that made various mutations and permutations of 
theory attractive and productive, to alienating your present intellectual 
self from the self that found it all very exciting and generative.
It’s also dangerous because you begin to overread the theoretical 
moment as the causal agent behind every problem of the contemporary 
academy. Valentine Cunningham, for example, attributes almost every 
novelty in the vocabulary and practice of humanistic scholarship since 
1960 to theory’s conquest. There are deeper drivers here, and they not 
only survive theory, but predate it. Among them is academic careerism 
itself. Theory sharpened its knives, but aspirant scholars in the humani-
ties and elsewhere must still today present an account of themselves as 
more brilliant, more original and more important than any others of 
their cohort while also pledging their fidelity to reigning orthodoxies in 
their discipline. Theory’s overthrow hasn’t changed any of that, nor did 
theory cause it to happen. Too many talented people chasing too few 
desirable jobs did. Cunningham argues that “criticism always claims 
newness”, but really, all humanistic scholarship since modernism or so 
does, and in this, is really only following on the lead of literature itself, 
as Morris Dickstein notes in his essay in the volume.
This is not to underrate the particular forms of self-interest that 
theory serviced in very particular ways. J.G. Merquior’s essay “Theorrhea 
and Kulturkritik” notes this by commenting: “That a deep cultural cri-
sis is endemic to historical modernity seems to have been more eagerly 
assumed than properly demonstrated, no doubt because, more often 
than not, those who generally do the assuming—humanist intellectu-
als—have every interest in being perceived as soul doctors to a sick 
civilization” (245). In many ways, theory was the ultimate careerist 
maneuver, because its normal operations conferred upon the theorist a 
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position of epistemologically unimpeachable, self-confirming authority 
(in part by claiming to abjure authority) while also freeing the theorist 
from having to know anything but theory in order to exert such author-
ity. I can’t be the only person who was subjected in graduate school (or 
later) to the peculiar spectacle of a dedicated, philosophically rigorous 
postmodernist proclaiming that only those who had thoroughly read 
the entire corpus of a particular theorist’s work should be permitted to 
speak about it. Indeed, such gestures of intellectual hypocrisy—some of 
them more subtle, some less so—are a particular target of mockery and 
anger from the authors in Theory’s Empire, and with some justification. 
It was hard not to see Derrida’s infamous assertion of conventional 
authorial rights over his interview on Heidegger as one of many such 
moments of contradiction.
One of the other oddities of the anthology is that almost no one 
gives a convincing account of their own survival of colonial domination 
by theory (including those essays contemporaneous with theory’s rise, 
which already adopt the posture of defeated defiance.) I suppose you 
could say that some paint themselves as autochthonous survivors who 
dug themselves into the institutional maquis for a long guerilla struggle 
and are now celebrating as the colonizer’s regime collapses. Others set 
themselves up more as members of a lost Stone Age tribe who were 
never contaminated by the colonizer’s modernity, or as archaeologists 
digging into layers of criticism that lie below the theory strata. A few 
are positioned as latter-day nativists reaching back to the precolonial 
era for renovation, and still others, as nationalists who worked with 
the empire, have assimilated the colonizer’s ways but are now ready 
to renounce him and declare independence. (Pretty close to my self-
presentation here.)
What’s important in this regard is that because the anthology col-
lects many older essays as well as recent ones, it gives rise to some 
suspicion that theory’s empire was considerably less imperial than its 
most strident critics tend to claim, that it was always less influential 
and powerful than either the lords of theory or their enemies suggested. 
Perhaps I’m only inclined to think that because that’s what I think 
about other empires, too, but I think many academics simply amiably 
went about their business in the era of high theory, borrowing a bit 
from such work here and there, but hardly worshipping at its altars 
or angrily burning its fetishes. Certainly that’s the way Foucault was 
commonly appropriated by many historians, as a practical device for 
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identifying new subjects to research (said historians then, as often as 
not, debunked Foucault’s concrete historical claims in consequence.)
There are some other points that emerge along the way in the book 
that strike me as important. One is the amnesia of theory at its high-
water mark, which I think was both a substantive feature of theoretical 
argument and sociological feature of the reproduction of the human-
istic academy in those years. So when John Ellis observes of Stanley 
Fish’s work that it ignored the past, that in Fish’s work, “philosophy of 
science begins with Thomas Kuhn, serious questions about the idea 
of truth and the positivist theory of language begin with Derrida, ju-
risprudence begins with the radical Critical Legal Studies movement” 
(105). I think he’s exactly right, and not just about Fish.
I think this became a feature of how many of us were trained and 
how we trained ourselves, a part of the ordinary discourse of confer-
ences, reading groups, and so on. Theory began with the last person 
who was commonly authenticated as its progenitor, and that was 
good enough—largely because it helped younger academics frame 
themselves as making original gestures or “interventions” into various 
debates. I had a senior colleague in anthropology who used to fall into 
amusing rants every time he and I went to hear a presentation by a 
young anthropologist, and with some reason, because in the vast ma-
jority of such presentations, the author would proclaim, often citing 
critical theory, that they were beginning for the first time to reflexively 
consider the role of the anthropologist himself or herself in generating 
anthropological knowledge. He was right, this is a silly gesture: such 
concerns have haunted anthropology all the way back to its origins. 
The same affliction affected us all across a wide swath of disciplines: we 
reinvented wheels, fire, alphabets and chortled in satisfaction at our 
own cleverness. Theory dropped into our midst like commodities drop 
into a cargo cult, and our reaction was roughly the same, right up to 
eagerly scanning the skies for the next French thinker to drop down 
and inventing our own crude substitutes when the interval between 
drops grew too lengthy.
This makes me think that another issue which gets discussed here 
and there but whose importance is underappreciated is the role of 
theory in shaping the average or ordinary work of scholarship. Almost 
all the hue and cry in the essays is either about the foundational or 
canonical theorists or about various academic superstars. While I think 
it’s true, as I suggested earlier, that many scholars only had a pass-
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ing and pragmatic relation to theory, I also think theory was a kind 
of attractor that pulled a wave of “ordinary” scholarship towards it. I 
remember being paralyzed by one of the first scholarly book reviews 
I wrote, holding on to it for months, because I found when I had 
finished that I’d written a very hostile review, largely because of the 
way that a work which might have had some workaday, craftsmanlike 
value as a monograph about the history of European representations of 
African bodies had wrapped itself in a rigid Foucauldian straightjacket 
and used theory as a justification for its chaotic and empirically weak 
arguments. (I was paralyzed because I felt bad about roughing up the 
author so much, but I got over it and published it eventually.)
This would be one of my acute criticisms of the subspecies of 
theory that became postcolonialism, that the ordinary work of post-
colonial scholarship takes the already deeply problematic arguments 
and style of the dominant superstars like Spivak, Prakash and Bhabha 
and operationalizes it as yeoman-level banality. There’s a kind of miss-
ing generation of monographs as a result, an absence of substantive, 
minutely authoritative, carefully researched and highly specialized 
knowledge that serves as a foundation for more sweeping syntheses and 
broadly argued scholarship. As I look over my shelves, I spot numerous 
works in history, cultural anthropology, critical theory, literary studies, 
cultural studies, whose only major lasting usefulness is as a historical 
document of a theoretical moment, works that you literally wouldn’t 
consult for any other purpose. As Erin O’Connor notes in her essay, 
the problem here in part is the dissemination of formulas, of totemic 
gestures, and more frustratingly, of a scholarship which is consumed 
by an understanding of its own impossibility, or as M.H. Abrams says 
of Hillis Miller, of a deliberate dedication not just to labyrinths but to 
dead ends within labyrinths.
Though once again, it’s also important to remember that some of 
the deeper driver here is not the boogeyman of theory, but the whole 
of academic careerism. Our bookshelves still groan with books and 
articles that need not have been written, but they will continue to be 
written as long as they are the fetish which proves that the academic 
apprentice is now a worthy journeyman who can step onto the tenure 
track. But at least if we must write unnecessary books, it would be nice 
if those books might add minutely to knowledge of some specialized 
subject. In fact, one of the good things that came out of the moment 
of theory was the legitimate expansion of academic subject matter: I 
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was pleasantly surprised to see that the bitching and moaning about 
cultural studies, popular culture and “trivial subjects” from scholars 
who superficially call for a return to a high literary canon as the proper 
subject of literary criticism was kept to a minimum in the volume, 
indeed, the longest specific criticism of cultural studies, by Stephen 
Adam Schwartz, never indulges in this vice. (I especially liked Schwartz’ 
observation that cultural studies is actually governed by methodological 
individualism, and thus a form of ethnocentrism: my principal answer 
would be to say that for me that’s a feature rather than a bug.)
It is a straightforwardly good thing that historians now write 
about a whole range of topics that were relatively unstudied in 1965; a 
straightforwardly good thing that literary critics read and think about 
a much wider range of texts than they once did. As Morris Dickstein 
notes, the era of high theory in the 1980s was not the first to discover 
the problem that there might not be a hell of a lot left to say about liter-
ary works that people had been reading and interpreting for centuries. 
This is why is makes me all the more regretful that theory dragged so 
much of the workaday business of academic writing towards its own 
forms of epistemological blockage and vacuity, because there were at 
least a great many new things to write about.
I suppose if I had one hope from this volume, it’s that people who 
read it and take it seriously won’t be the kind of lazy Sokolites that 
Michael Bérubé justifiably complains about, because nowhere in the 
volume does anyone claim that doing literary analysis or humanistic 
scholarship is easy or straightforward. If this is a roadmap to the future, 
it does not go from point A to point B, much to its credit.
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